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Abstract 
 
  This paper introduces state dependent utility into the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
economy by allowing the representative agent’s coefficient of relative risk aversion to vary with 
the underlying economy’s growth rate.  Existence of equilibrium is proved and its asymptotic 
properties analyzed.  This generalization leads to level dependent marginal rates of substitution, 
a property that sharply distinguishes this model from the standard construct.  For very low 
coefficients of relative risk aversion, the equilibrium risk free and risky security returns are 
demonstrated to have volatilities and an associated equity premium that substantially exceed 
what is found in the data.  This provides a contrasting perspective on the classic “equity premium 
puzzle.” 
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1.  Introduction 
  This paper explores the implications for asset pricing of allowing the representative 
agent’s coefficient of relative risk aversion to vary with the economy’s growth rate of 
consumption. That such preference representations are consistent with the choice theoretic 
foundations of utility theory was first argued in Savage (1972).  Myerson (1991) provides an 
axiomatic base for the precise form considered here.   
  In light of the increasing popularity of the state dependent utility framework, no doubt 
motivated by observations suggesting the pervasiveness of changes in the markets’ tolerance for 
risk, it seems appropriate to explore the full implications of this modeling hypothesis for asset 
pricing in particular. Our main result is that, at least for the very natural formulation that we 
adopt, the consequences of allowing risk aversion to be state dependent are extreme. They arise 
from the fact that agents’demand for securities will depend not only upon the growth rate of 
consumption (as in the canonical case, cf. Mehra and Prescott (1985)) but upon its level as well. 
The end-effect is to introduce another source of variation to the pricing kernel, one that is 
unrelated to the volatility of the underlying fundamentals and whose importance grows 
disproportionately as the economy itself is growing.   
  The implications of this latter feature are such as to alter dramatically the form of the 
classic asset pricing puzzles: for standard parameterizations, the equity premium is easily 
matched or exceeded, the risk free rate is asymptotically too low, the Hansen-Jagannathan 
bounds are easily satisfied, and the standard deviations of equity and risk free returns are too 
large relative to the data. At the minimum, our uncovering of this disturbing property should 
serve as a warning signal for those relying on state dependent preferences to help them resolve 
some outstanding puzzles.   
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  General support for the hypothesis that risk aversion is state dependent may be found in 
recent results from the experimental psychology and economics literatures.  Isen and Patrick 
(1983), Isen and Geva (1978) and Nygren et al. (1996) present evidence suggesting that happy 
decision makers – those who have received a consumption increase – are much less willing to 
gamble than control groups.  Isen (1996) interprets these results as suggesting that persons in a 
“good mood” are more reluctant to gamble because losing might undermine their good mood.  
Bosh-Domènech and Silvestre (1999) report the results of an experiment in which the subjects 
were given title to a random payout of money and were asked if they wished to insure against a 
20% chance of having their personal monetary realization taken from them.  Half of the subjects 
chose to insure, but only if their income realization fell within the high level category, a response 
that associates greater risk aversion with higher income levels. Strictly speaking, these 
experiments do not focus on pure growth rate effects, and we are unaware of any experiment that 
does.  Nevertheless, they are consistent with the postulate of associating higher risk aversion 
with greater consumption growth and higher consumption levels.  Broadly speaking, this is the 
perspective that risk aversion is procyclical. 
Strong empirical evidence to the contrary is provided by Gordon and St-Amour (2002) 
who postulate a model with time varying risk aversion not unlike the one to be considered here, 
and estimate the implied process on risk aversion arising from per capita consumption and 
financial return data.  Their basic finding is that risk aversion is strongly countercyclical, rising 
during recessions and falling during expansions.  In addition, the Gordon and St.-Amour (2002) 
CRRA estimate moves opposite to the University of Michigan index of consumer confidence, a 
fact that is also broadly consistent with their finding of countercyclical risk aversion.  
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These results are also in harmony with the basic postulates underlying the habit formation 
literature where, ceteris paribus, higher current consumption levels (and thus growth rates ex 
post) are associated with locally lower risk aversion on the part of the representative agent.  We 
adopt the countercyclical perspective as our benchmark.  The results we obtain are independent, 
however, of the specific pattern of this variation: the same implications are associated with 
procyclical or countercyclical risk aversion.  
Other relevant literature includes Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Constantinides (1986), 
Mehra and Sah (2001), and Kraus and Sagi (2002).  Constantinides (1986) initiated the by-now-
substantial habit formation literature.  Using this device Campbell and Cochrane (1999), more 
recently, present a precisely calibrated model that is broadly consistent with the stylized facts of 
the financial markets.  The level of effective risk aversion they employ is, however, quite high.  
The present paper replicates many of the results in their model with much lower effective risk 
aversion; this is possible because the underlying risk variation mechanism is fundamentally 
different from that in Campbell and Cochrane (1999).  Also of direct relevance is Mehra and Sah 
(2002), who derive the partial equilibrium effects of small fluctuations in agents’ subjective 
preferences (discount rates and risk aversion) on the volatility of asset prices.  Our model may be 
viewed as the return-focused, general equilibrium counterpart of the Mehra and Sah (2002) 
analysis.  A related (the underlying mechanism is similar) but much more elaborate model can be 
found in Kraus and Sagi (2002).  We discuss this paper and Melino and Yang (2001) in more 
detail in a later section. 
  An outline of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 presents the model in the context of the 
classic setting of Mehra and Prescott (1985), while the solution methodology is detailed in the 
associated appendix.  Section 3 provides a full overview and interpretation of a numerical  
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analysis of the model, and explores the consequences of admitting a more general stochastic 
structure.  A comparison with other models in the literature is provided in Section 4 while 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.  The Model 
  2.1  The Model 
  In this section we present an adaptation of the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model and 
detail the methodology for computing its financial equilibrium.  Since the model is so familiar 
the description will be parsimonious.  
  There is a financial market in which an equity claim to an exogenous output stream{yt} is 
traded.  Output grows at the stationary stochastic growth rate xt according to 
(2.1)      yt+1 = xt+1yt.   
  An infinitely lived representative agent with state dependent utility organizes his 
preference for random consumption paths according to 
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 is the agent’s period utility function and E the expectations operator.  
The agent’s CRRA, at, is presumed to vary stochastically through time.  Subsequently we will 
relate at closely to the output growth rate xt but for the moment it will be useful to preserve the 
added generality.  In principle, the state of this economy is therefore the triple (yt, xt, at). 
  Taking security prices as given the representative agent solves   
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where  tttt pp(y,x,) =a  denotes the period t price of the equity claim, and zt = z(y t, xt, at) the 
fraction of the perfectly divisible share held by the agent.  By well known arguments, 
equilibrium for this economy is characterized by the asset price function p(yt, xt, at) that solves: 
(2.4)    u1(yt,at) p(y t, xt, at)  =   [ ] 1t1t1t1t1t1t1 u(y,)p(y,x,)y. ++++++ baa+ ￿  
  t1t1t1ttt dF(y,x,;y,x,) +++ aa  
  In a like fashion, the period t price of a risk free asset, paying one unit of the output good 
in every state next period and assumed to be in zero net supply, is given by 







+++ a ￿￿ ￿￿ = ￿￿ a ￿￿ ￿￿
. 
  The corresponding conditional period rates of return for these security, denoted 
respectively by r
e(yt+1, xt+1, at+1; yt, x t, at) and 
f r (yt, xt, at) are thus: 
      re(yt+1, xt+1 at+1; yt, xt, at) =  t1t1t+1t1
ttt
p(y, x, a) y 
p(y, x a) 
+++ +  - 1, and 







=  - 1. 
 
Equation (2.4), in particular, is obtained from substituting the market clearing conditions 
ct = yt and z t = 1 into the representative agent’s necessary and sufficient first order condition.  For 
the specialized functional forms specified later in the paper, we prove that an equilibrium exists 
constructively.  See Appendix 1.  
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  Of crucial significance for asset pricing is the behavior of the representative agent’s 
equilibrium intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS).  Under the utility specification 

























  Two features stand out relative to the IMRSt, t+1 in the standard Mehra and Prescott 










  (i)  the IMRSt, t+1 depends on the output level yt, and 
  (ii)  there is an added source of volatility, at, which is fundamentally different from the 
customary pure consumption uncertainty.  With variation in at the agent’s period utility varies 
even if there is no uncertainty in his consumption growth rate.  To distinguish this latter source 
of risk from the variation in utility arising from consumption uncertainty alone, it will be referred 
to as “mood” or “outlook” uncertainty in recognition of the observation that an individual’s 
mood can substantially affect his assessment of his objective circumstances.  Adding this feature 
to an otherwise parsimonious-in-the-extreme model makes explicit, in one particularly simple 
way, the assertion that such mood swings can potentially influence an individual’s economic 
behavior.  Note also that these mood swings are fully anticipated by the agent and thus may be 
fully hedged.  The results to follow are thus unrelated to any aspect of market incompleteness. 
  It is the associated level effect, however, that gives these mood swings potency for asset 
pricing.  From (2.6) we see that as yt increases the standard deviation of the IMRSt, t+1 will 
similarly increase as at – at+1 is stochastically negative and then positive.  As a result, the agent  
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will increasingly desire to smooth his consumption without in fact being able to do so.  
Anticipating somewhat the results to follow this effect gives rise asymptotically to very high 
equilibrium risk free asset prices (and thus low risk free rates) and to very low equity prices (and, 
simultaneously, high equity returns).  A high equity premium follows accordingly. 
  2.2  Sources of the Level Effect 







 is a special case of the specification 
1- u(c)=?c
a % % , 
with  ? % a bounded random variable with  ?<0 for 1 a> % % .  The question to be explored is whether 
the level effect is due in any way to variation in the multiplicative factor  ? % , rather than variation 








 with a % .  There are a number of ways to 
tackle this issue, two of which are considered below. 




 should rule them out.  But it does not.  As before, let  12 a{a,a} ˛ %  with 





















Assuming at>1 for all t, the standard deviation of this quantity will also grow without 
bound as yt increases.  At least at this superficial level there is no indication that the 
multiplicative factor is the source of the results. 







:  no 
variation in the CRRA, but variation in the multiplicative factor.  
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  The associated maximization problem of the representative agent is  
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    s.t.      ttt+1ttt c+pz(p+y)z £  
where zt denotes the fraction of the equity security demanded.  In equilibrium 
( ttt+1tt+1t c= y,  y = xy %  ,  and zt =1), the equity pricing function must satisfy 










  The same solution procedure as in Mehra and Prescott (1985) will work for the above 
equation because the level of output is not present in the pricing kernel; that is, the IMRS is level 
independent.  Its standard deviation does not grow with output. Variations in the multiplicative 
factor ? % appear not to drive the results.  We note that problem (2.8) is formally equivalent to the 
standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) formulation where the discount factor is stochastic, a model 
with no unusual asset pricing features.
1 
  Whatever unexpected asset pricing features this model may possess, these comments 
suggest that CRRA variation can be their only source.  It remains only to calibrate the model and 
to explore its remaining implications numerically. 
2.3  Probability Structures. 
  We follow Mehra and Prescott (1985) exactly and specify a two state Markov chain 
governing the growth rate of output: 
                                                  
1 We need to qualify this comment somewhat.  In a model with Epstein-Zinn/Weil preferences where the CRRA and 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) can be specified independently, Melino and Yang (2001) find that 
state dependent time preferences can have substantial effects, when employed in conjunction with a variable CRRA.  
In particular, in conjunction with a variable CRRA, it can serve as a substitute for variation in the EIS in achieving a 
high premium.  
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  In the spirit of the habit formation literature, we first assume at˛{a1, a2} where 
a1=a(x 1)<a(x2) = a2:  the agent is relatively less risk averse in the high-growth-in-output state. 
  Notice under this specification that output growth and the CRRA are perfectly negatively 
correlated.  This latter feature can be relaxed in a straightforward and simple way by specifying a 


















   
In the above formulation, the entries F, p, s, ?, and H may be selected to admit any specification 
of corr(at, at-1), corr(y t, yt-1), and corr(at, y t).  This added generality will be seen to leave the 
fundamental results of the paper largely unaltered, however.  For this reason we take (2.9) as the 
benchmark output process for most of our discussion. 
  Let us next specialize equations (2.4) and (2.5) to accommodate our specific output 
process; with this substitution they become, respectively: 
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  Equation (2.11), although the direct analogue of the pricing equation (7) in Mehra and 
Prescott (1985), is fundamentally more complex in structure.  In particular the pricing function, 
which solves (2.11), cannot be homogeneous of degree one in output (as in Mehra and Prescott 
(1985)) so that (2.11) represents a countably infinite set of (level dependent) linear equations.  
Furthermore, the equilibrium pricing function cannot be expressed as the fixed point of a 
contraction.  Nevertheless, there is a certain recursivity present in the structure of equation 
(2.11), which can be readily exploited to construct its solution.  See also Appendix 1. 
  2.4  Asymptotic Properties of the Risk Free Security Price 
In the calibration to follow, we will need to choose reasonable values of a1 and a2 and the 
risk free security price will be seen to yield clues as to what they should be.  For this reason it 
will be useful to explore the asymptotic behavior of the risk free security price as output grows 
without bound through time.  In order to simplify the discussion further, let us also restrict the 
probability transition structure to the two state Mehra and Prescott (1985) case; with p11 = p22 =p.  
Since the ultimate goal is to explore relative model performance, such a restriction is appropriate 
at this point anyway. 
Under these restrictions, for any output level yt, the prices of the risk free asset in the high 
and low growth states are, respectively 
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f - - a , finite.  For the low growth state, however,  
  t2 q(y,x) ¥ a  as  ¥ a t y  because a 2- a 1>0.  As a result,  1 ) x , (y r 2 t
f - a .  With each 
state having equal asymptotic likelihood, the unconditional average risk free rate  f Er  satisfies,  
(2.15)  1












a ,  as  ¥ a t y . 
Furthermore, it is monotonically decreasing with time. 
  In a like fashion the unconditional asymptotic standard deviation satisfies  









a ; it is monotonically increasing. 
  Notice that in expression (2.15) (also in (2.16)) only the high-growth-low-risk-aversion 
values are represented.  Otherwise, the intuition encapsulated therein is pretty much standard: 
agents with higher subjective discount factors ß bid up security prices thereby lowering the risk 
free rate.  In a like fashion, a higher p suggests greater risk: consumption growth rates are either 
highly persistently favorable or unfavorable; risk averse agents value risk free assets more highly 
in these circumstances similarly bidding up prices.  Somewhat counterintuitively, as the agent 
becomes more risk averse in the high growth state (larger a1), asymptotic risk free security prices 
in that same state decline, a fact that leads to a higher asymptotic standard deviation. 
  It is important also to realize that these results do not depend critically on the assumption 
of greater risk aversion specifically in the low growth state.  If the converse were true; that is, if 
states one and two change roles so that a1 > a2, a scenario perhaps more in harmony with the 
experimental psychology literature, then  2
t22 q(y,x)(x)
-a bp a  and  t1 q(y,x) ¥ a .  The 
asymptotic formulae for 
f Er  and 
f SDr  are altered accordingly (in particular,  








- Œœ a ºß
a   as   t y ¥ a ), but their essential form remains the same.  Which state 
displays the greater risk aversion is thus not significant for the majority of the results to follow. 
  Recognizing that the price of the risk free asset effectively identifies the state contingent 
MRS, the remarks above have the implication that the expected MRS effectively becomes 
asymptotically unbounded, and it is this fundamental feature that drives many of the results. 
2.5 Calibration: Benchmark Formulation 
  To the extent possible, we initially rely on the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
calibration.  In particular, Mehra and Prescott (1985) choose ß = .96,  µ= .018,  d = .036, and p = 
.43 in order to match the mean, standard deviation, and first order autocorrelation in the growth 
rate of U.S. per capita consumption.  It remains first to specify a1 and a2.  As mentioned earlier, 
we look to the risk free security price to provide clues. 
  Since x1 > 1, notice that (2.15) implies that the risk free rate will be made lower if  
a1 is close to one.
2  It is also reasonable to hypothesize that, at a minimum, the representative 
agent would only be willing to pay a smaller and smaller fraction of his income to purchase one 
unit of the risk free security as his income grows arbitrarily large.  Such a security, after all, 
                                                  
2 It is possible, of course, to choose an a 1 so as to match exactly the empirically observed average real risk free rate 
of .8% (cf. Mehra and Prescott (1985)).  For ß=.96, x 1=1.056, p=.43, working backwards through (2.15) gives an 
a1=15.96; the agent must be dramatically risk loving in his high growth state.  While this result is perhaps not 
objectionable qualitatively, the magnitude appears too large to be reasonable, a fact that is itself directly attributable 
to the assumed low persistence in the output growth rate (.43).  High persistence (p=.95) yields a more conventional 
a1=-1.4 under the same calculation.  As with most asset pricing models, the one considered here is thus likely to 
yield a counterfactually high Erf.  These observations remind us how parsimonious the preference construct of 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) actually is.  In particular the CRRA and the elasticity of the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution are one and the same (a).  If we retain the natural assumption of risk aversion then the calculations 
above suggest that a matching of the empirical risk free rate will require not only a model where the CRRA and the 
EIMRS say be specified independently but one in which the latter displays considerable variations.  This is 
accomplished in Melino and Yang (2001).  
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represents a claim on only one unit of additional consumption.  To summarize, it is reasonable to 






   0 a   as  ¥ a t y  for any  } x , {x x 2 1 i ˛ . 
  In the case of  t1 q(y,x), such a requirement is automatically satisfied.  In the case of 
t2 q(y,x) ,  
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a , as  ¥ a t y  as well.  Our restrictions on a1 and a2 are thus 
that a1 ˜ 1 and a2 - a1 < 1.
3  Both restrictions are convenient, especially the latter one, because it 
suggests that our subsequent results do not require dramatic changes in the CRRA, a property 
that would challenge our sense of what is reasonable. 
These calculations also remind us that the financial return statistics for this model will be 
sensitive to the magnitude of output, and thus to the length of the time series we use as the basis 
of our statistical computations.  Denoting this time series length by the variable “S”, we will 
choose for S = 120, in the case of ß= .96 where the length of the period is interpreted to be one 
year.  In the case of  ß= .99 (period is one quarter), we choose S = 400.  Both of these 
parameterizations are roughly in conformity with the maximum length of available data sets.  All 
                                                  
3 This choice is also broadly consistent with the estimate in Gordon and St-Amour (2002). Their estimates for risk 
aversion are centered at .25.  
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reported statistics are averages of the indicated quantity computed for one thousand individual 
time series. 
  It remains only to fix the initial output level y0, a choice which is in some sense “dual” to 
the choice of the series length with a choice of S=100.  For all reported cases we choose y0=1 















ratio has limited empirical significance in this model, it 
does constitute a natural statistic around which to standardize.
5 
3.  Numerical Results 
  3.1  Replicating the Mehra and Prescott (1985) Experiments 
  Table (1) below presents a benchmark set of cases.  Not only do we report the first and 
second moments of all the series, but their basic correlation structure as well.  In reference to the 
Hansen-Jagannathan bound, the ratio SD(IMRS)/E(IMRS) is also reported; if the model is to 








 for the U.S. economy.   
                                                  
4 There is another sense in which y0=1 is a natural choice of starting point.  Note from (2.6) that the SD of the 
IMRSt,t+1 will increase without bound both as yt?  ¥ and as yt? 0.  Our results thus all apply to an endlessly 
shrinking economy as well.  These dual asymptotic results suggest y0=1 since departures (in either direction) give 
rise to the phenomena reported here. 
5 By “limited empirical significance” we mean that this ratio corresponds to the (value of equity)/GDP ratio only for 
an economy where all the income is capital income.  If we modify the model to accommodate a situation in which 














 are much 
lower for the same series length.  Mehra (1998) demonstrates that a properly calibrated model can account neither 




 ratio.  His CRRA is constant, however.  
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Table 1 
Summary Return Statistics:  Representative Cases 
(Unless Otherwise Indicated,  .036 d .018, µ .43, p .96, ß = = = = , S = 120, y 0=1) 
All Returns Expressed in Percent
 (i), (ii) 










a 1 = 1.0 
a 2 = 1.5 
D 
 
a 1 = .5 
a 2 = 1.0 
E 
 
a 1 = 4.0 
a 2 = 4.5 
F 
 
a 1 = 2.5 
a 2 = 2.0 
G 
 
a1 = 2.0 
a2 = 2.5 
d=0 
Er
e  6.98  9.58  16.95  16.14  21.5  21.57  20.63 
S.D.r
e  16.54  4.99  53.04  53.17  51.94  60.95  58.69 
Er
f  .80  9.10  8.47  7.19  15.74  7.69  9.72 
S.D.r
f  5.67  1.61  34.21  33.90  35.78  34.95  36.24 
Er
p  6.18  .48  8.48  8.94  5.76  13.9  10.91 
S.D.r
p  16.67  4.70  34.92  35.26  32.75  44.0  40.27 
ee
tt1 Corr(r,r) -   -.03  -.33  -.47  -.47  -.47  -.48  -.48 
ff
tt1 Corr(r,r) -   .87  -.15  -.15  -.15  -.14  -.15  -.15 
ef
tt Corr(r,r)   -.09  .34  .77  .77  .79  .64  .74 
SD(IMRS)/ 
E(IMRS)    .11  .20  .32  .39  .54  .49 











    1  1.05  1.16  1.08  1.14  1.13 
 
(i)  Data Sources:  Mehra and Prescott (1985), Mehra (1998), and Jones (2001);  the correlations 
are based on data for the period 1897-1998 , where r
f  is the real commercial paper rate and r
e  
is obtained from Cowles Foundation and CRISP data. 
(ii)  Panel B reports results from the original Mehra and Prescott (1985) model when the CRRA is 
fixed at  3 a =  
 








is reported in order to give some sense of the relative magnitude of the price-output ratio 
vis-à-vis its value in a pure Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy. For comparison purposes, Panel 
A provides the by-now-familiar summary financial statistics for the U.S. economy while Panel B  
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provides the corresponding Mehra and Prescott (1985) results for a representative choice of a.  
The classic equity premium puzzle is clearly evident, as are the other dimensions of model 
failure not emphasized in Mehra and Prescott (1985): the return standard deviations are much too 
low, the mean security returns are uniformly too high, and the correlation structure generally 
does not conform to the data.  The low value of the SD(IMRS)/E(IMRS) ratio is fully consistent 
with these results. 
Panel C reports results under the presumption of both consumption and “outlook” 
uncertainty and we will take it as the benchmark case.  While the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion in each state is very low, the premium rises to 8.48%.
6 The standard deviation of all the 
series have increased enormously and now substantially exceed their corresponding values in the 
data.  Mean security returns are also excessive although less so than for standard deviations, 
particular in the case of the risk free rate and the premium.  The pattern of correlations departs 
little from the Mehra and Prescott (1985) case and the SD(IMRS)/E(IMRS) more than exceeds 
the level necessary to resolve the equity premium puzzle.  All of this is accomplished in a 
context in which  p E()
y
does not  depart much from its corresponding value in the standard Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) economy.  From the perspective of this particular adaptation of the Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) model, the “puzzle” is not that the actual premium and security return 
standard deviations are so high but that they are so low.  
Panels D and E provide comparative statistics when the agent is made, respectively, less 
and more risk averse (relative to Panel C) all the while maintaining the same CRRA risk 
differential of one half.  Comparing Panels C and D we observe that as the agent becomes less 
                                                  
6 This results is broadly consistent with the estimates of Gordon and St-Amour who find that consumption risk 
accounts for less than 1% of the fitted risk premium.  In this model, the premium observed when a1=a 2=2.25 (only 
consumption growth uncertainty) is only 4% of the 7.51% figure.  
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risk averse, average returns to both equity and debt decline, the more so for the risk free security.  
As a result, the premium rises.  We attribute this latter observation to the fact that as a1 and a2 
decline, all the while maintaining  .5 a a 1 2 = - , they become more disparate on a relative basis 





; for Panel C this ratio is .50 while for Panel D it is 
2.0).  In effect, although the average level of risk aversion declines, with the familiar 
consequences, relative outlook variation increases.  The latter effects dominate with the result 
that the riskiness of the agent’s overall environment increases.  On a relative basis the risky asset 
becomes less valuable and the premium rises. The relative outlook affect diminishes, however, if 






==.  As a result 
the premium declines to 5.76%, although mean returns rise and standard deviations are little 
affected.  But this cannot be the full story.  Table (2) presents a set of cases in which a1 and a2 
are progressively increased, all the while maintaining the same differential of a2 – a1 =½.  Panel 
B contains the analogous results for the corresponding Mehra and Prescott (1985) economies. 
What is of interest here is the observation that the consequences of “outlook” uncertainty 
for the premium increase when the average CRRA decreases. This is the exact opposite of the 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) result.  In fact, the premium eventually turns negative for sufficiently 
high CRRA.  Our strong, and somewhat striking, results are a manifestation of low rather than 
high average risk aversion.  Furthermore, the effects are quite large.  For this reason we will 
typically limit a1 and a2 not only to differ by at most .5 but also to be in the neighborhood of 
one.
7 
                                                  
7 We also limit the difference between a 1 and a 2 because otherwise the return standard deviations become extremely 
large.  In the case of  12 a1,a1.75 == , for example, 
eeff
Er35,S.D.r97,Er13.3,S.D.r51, === =   
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Table 2 
Comparative Dynamics: Changes in a1, a2, and 
Comparison with Mehra and Prescott (1985) Results 
(ß = 96,  µ = .018,  d = .036,  p = 43,  s = 120,  y0 = 1 
  Panel A  Panel B 
  a 1 = 1.0 
a 2 = 1.5  
a 1 = 3 
a 2 = 3.5 
a 1 = 11 
a 2 =11.5 
a1 = 21 
a2 = 21.5 
a=1.25  a =3.25  a =11.25  a = 21.25 
Er
e  16.95  20.10  29.92  33.51  6.49  10.00  20.61  24.76 
S.D.r
e  53.04  52.46  49.60  45.06  3.89  5.15  10.87  17.19 
Er
f  8.47  13.43  29.46  38.07  6.33  9.47  17.38  16.82 
S.D.r
f  34.21  35.38  38.83  40.12  .66  1.75  6.20  10.37 
Er
p  8.48  6.68  .46  -4.56  .15  .53  3.23  7.94 
S.D.r
p  34.92  33.54  28.78  25.37  3.82  4.82  8.64  12.55 
ee
tt1 Corr(r,r) -   -.47  -.47  -.47  -.45  -.18  -.34  -.53  -.56 
ff
tt1 Corr(r,r) -   -.15  -.15  -.11  -.02  -.15  -.15  -.15  -.15 




t -   .77  .78  .82  .83  .18  .35  .61  .69 
SD(IMRS)/ 
E(IMRS) 
















1.05  1.02  .98  .94  1  1  1  1 
 
We have postulated that agents display less risk aversion when they are confronted by the 
experience of greater consumption growth.  As noted in the introduction, Bosch-Domenech and 
Silvestre (1999) present indirect evidence, however, that the contrary is the case.  For this reason 
it is appropriate to consider a sample of cases under the orthogonal assumption that agents 
display more risk aversion in the high growth state,  1 2 a a > , an assertion that suggests a strong 
                                                                                                                                                                 
p Er21 = and 
p S.D.r70 = (all return measures in percent).  
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desire “to preserve one’s gains when they are high.” The results of this exercise are summarized 
in Panel F of Table 1.  Comparing Panels C and F we observe that the mean and S.D. of equity 
returns both increase while the opposite is true for the risk free security.  As a result the  p Er  
rises in Panel F to 13.9%: if anything the results are strengthened when low growth is associated 
with low risk aversion.  Notice that the correlation structure is largely unaffected.  Bearing in 
mind these observations and preferring the hypothesis most consistent with the data, the case of 
Panel C is retained as the benchmark.   
Our latter results strongly suggest that “outlook” variation, rather than  
consumption variation, is the dominant effect.  To confirm this assertion we examined the return 
characteristics of an economy in which there is no consumption variation at all, i.e., we fix 
1 2 a a > , and  0 d= . The results of this exercise are presented in Table 1, Panel G.  Relative to 
Panel C, the premium is even larger (standard deviations are largely unchanged, however).  This 
suggests that within the class of Lucas (1978) asset pricing models, uncertainty in the period 
utility function of the type considered here will matter overwhelmingly more importantly for the 
characteristics of asset prices than will any postulated variation in the consumption (dividend) 
process.
8   
  3.2  Asset Prices and the Level of Wealth 
  Table 2 reminds us that level effects can reverse standard intuition (in particular, higher 
average risk aversion lowers the premium), a fact that encourages the exploration of the 
consequences of wealth effects more broadly in the model.  Useful information is provided in 
Table 3, where the length of the output series, S, is allowed to vary for two distinct correlation 
                                                  
8 More precisely, while the dividend growth autocorrelations determines the autocorrelation of risk free and risky 
returns, their mean values and standard deviation are governed by changes in the CRRA.  
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structures.9  Panel A is the standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) output process while Panel B 
admits a mild degree of positive output growth correlation. 
Table 3 
Security Return Statistics 
Various Time Series Lengths 
(For all cases, ß = .96,  µ = .018,  d = 0.36) 
 
 
  Panel A 
a 1 = .7, a2 = .9, p = .43 
Panel B 
a1 = .7, a2 = .9, p = .70 
  S=120  S=200  S=400  S=120  S=200  S=400 
Er
e  7.01  9.89  24.87  6.31  7.79  15.36 
S.D.r
e  17.36  31.50  78.46  12.13  22.10  56.23 
Er
f  6.01  6.59  8.60  5.51  5.13  2.91 
S.D.r
f  13.95  23.25  44.30  8.40  13.37  25.07 
Er
ps  1.01  3.29  16.27  .80  2.65  12.46 
S.D.r
p  9.69  19.27  55.15  8.49  17.06  47.95 




t -   -.52  -.52  -.43  -.16  -.23  -.21 




t -   -.15  -.15  -.14  .38  .39  .41 




t -   .83  .80  .73  .73  .65  .54 
 
  There are several aspects of Table 3 that merit attention.  First, as S increases and the 
agent’s consumption grows, he increasingly resists the purchase of the equity security.  This is 
overwhelmingly a pure “outlook effect”: as agents become wealthier they become increasingly 
concerned for a reversal of fortune, and the equity security provides no hedge against this 
possibility. 
  Of greater interest is the differing behavior of the average risk free rate across the two 
cases.  While the mean risk free rate increases with consumption in Panel A, the reverse is true in 
                                                  
9 For these discussions we temporarily abandon the benchmark case (Table 1, Panel C), as the base case (S=120) 
with a 1-a2=.50 exhibits enormous mean returns and return standard deviations as S grows.  For Table 3 we thus  
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Panel B.  It is the difference in the basic risk structure of the two cases that accounts for the 
difference: Panel B describes the higher risk environment as consumption growth is non trivially 
persistent.  In Panel A, the stochastic growth structure is close to independence. 
  In contrast to the case of Panel A, the parameterization of Panel B thus implies that 
periods of negative consumption growth may persist for many periods.  As agents become 
wealthier, this possibility becomes of greater concern, so much so as to reverse the pattern of risk 
free security prices: these prices are bid up in Panel B as the agents become wealthier.  The other 
manifestation of this same effect is the fact that all security prices are higher under Panel B on a 
comparative case by case basis.  Another way to accentuate the centrality of the level effect is to 
compute the analogous results for Panels A and B where growth is absent (µ=0).  In the case of 
Panel A, the mean premium is .19% while in Panel B it is .26% (in both cases for all values of 
S). 
  At this point where do we stand?  There are a few tentative conclusions that may be 
reached.  First, when level effects are admitted into the model, the nature of the asset pricing 
puzzles in a standard Mehra and Prescott (1985) economy is radically transformed.  The standard 
deviations of equity and risk free returns – as well as of the premium – are typically excessive, 
the equity premium itself is frequently too large, and the Hansen-Jagannathan bound is easily 
satisfied.  All this is accomplished in an environment where the price to output ratio is within 
reasonable bounds.  On the other hand, the results of Table 3 report nonstationarity in the r
e and 
rf series, something that is generally understood to be absent in the data.   
  3.3  Replicating the Basic Stylized Facts: How Close Can We Come? 
  In this section we attempt to identify the specific parameters that appear key to presenting 
a better replication of U.S. data.  There is little flexibility along most dimensions if we are to be 
                                                                                                                                                                 
reduce a1-a2 to .4.  
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faithful to Mehra and Prescott’s (1985) formulation.  In fact, all that is possible is to modify the 
stochastic structure in order to break the perfect negative correlation between a and x.   
  Accordingly, we admit independently specified (i.e.,  (x,)1 ra„ % % ) stochastic processes on 
x,and a % %  as per (2.10).  Table 4 presents an initial comparative analysis for a wide class of 
probability structures.  No a priori attempt is made to replicate the specific U.S. output process.  
The tentative message of these cases is pretty much as before: premia can easily be very large, 
though usually at the cost of excessive return volatility.  As noted earlier, these standard 
deviations are very sensitive to the CRRA differential.  As the differential increases, furthermore, 
expected equity returns increase while the expected risk free rate decreases, both effects being 
consistent with the increase in effective risk. 
  The chief beneficiary of this generalization appears largely to be a potential improvement 
in the correlation structure of returns vis-à-vis the cases of Table 1.  In the case of Panel 2B, for 
example, 
ee
tt1 (r,r) - r and 
ff
tt1 (r,r) - r  now almost exactly match the data.  While 
ef
tt (r,r) r  is still too 
high, it is much less than in standard formulations.  For this particular choice of probability 
structure,  tt1 (x,x) - r  is still low (as in the data) while  tt (x,) ra  is slightly positive, a fact that 
suggests that the version of the model which best reflects the experimental literature (i.e., which 
asserts that the agent is generally more risk averse in the high payoff state) is also the version 
that best replicates the data.  
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Table 4 
Statistical Return Summaries 
Various Correlation Structures
(i) 
For all Cases:  µ = .018,  d = .036,  ß = .96,  S = 120 
All Return Quantities in Percent 
(a) mean return   (b) standard deviation of return 
 
Panel 1 
a 1 = 1.1, a2 = 1.4 
  A  B  C  D 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
r
e    9.64  26.94  7.18  12.67  9.27  25.20  7.24  13.39 
r
f    6.00  16.86  5.70  5.70  6.56  17.04  5.96  6.70 
r
p    3.64  20.07  1.49  11.17  2.71  17.52  1.29  11.31 
ee
tt1 (r,r) - r   -.4  .11  -.39  .09 
ff
tt1 (r,r) - r   .09  .79  .09  .80 
ef
tt (r,r) r   .67  .52  .73  .60 
Panel 2 
a 1 = 1.1, a2 = 1.7 
  A  B  C  D 
  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
r
e    20.47  64.78  10.09  32.21  19.60  62.43  10.45  35.37 
r
f    5.37  31.82  3.74  10.11  6.48  32.01  4.36  11.12 
r
p    15.10  51.33  6.35  30.58  13.11  48.33  6.09  33.11 
ee
tt1 (r,r) - r   -.34  .01  -.33  -.01 
ff
tt1 (r,r) - r   .09  .79  .09  .78 
ef
tt (r,r) r   .63  .40  .40  .41 
 
(i)  Correlation Structure  Resultant Matrix (2.10) 
  Corr(x t, x t-1)  Corr(a t, at-1)  Corr(x t, at)  f   p  s  H  ? 
Panel A   .1  .1  .1  .5298  .0202  .0247  .4253  .01 
Panel B  .1  .1  .8  .8393  .0607  .0742  .0258  .03 
Panel C  .8  .8  .1  .5496  .0004  .0034  .4466  .03 
Panel D  .8  .8  .8  .8996  .0004  .0034  .0966  .03 
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Note also that for both panels, cases B and D are closely similar.  Both agree only on the ?(x t, at) 
dimension, a fact that gives added support to the latter assertion. 
  With this probabilistic generality all of the conclusions to data remain unaltered: for very 
low levels of average risk aversion, the mean and standard deviation of returns as well as the 
premium and its standard deviation are all easily made too large relative to U.S. data. 
4. Further Comparison with the Literature 
Of interest are other models with changing risk aversion.  It is well known that the 
effective CRRA of a representative agent under habit formation changes with his past 
consumption history.  A recent and particularly comprehensive application of this fact is 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), who postulate an external habit.  These authors define the 
consumption “surplus above the habit,”  t s , by  tttt s=(c-x)/c %  where  t x  is the habit, and 








where a is the representative agent’s fixed CRRA.  Under the formulation considered in this 
paper, the CRRA is also stochastic and stationary.  For Campbell and Cochrane (1998), however, 










,  is a stationary random variable: there are no level effects.  
Viewing the same issue from a slightly different perspective, the consumption surplus variable in 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is a deterministic function of current consumption.  This implies 
that all the IMRS variation must be consumption driven.  Without any additional source of risk, 
it is not surprising that they require a relatively high CRRA to achieve their results.  In both of 
these respects their model is fundamentally different from the one considered here, which  
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accepts nonstationarities as the price of relying on an almost trivially low CRRA (unlike in 
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). 
  Another related paper is Danthine and Donaldson (2002), which postulates a variable risk 
sharing mechanism as a route to constructing a model which simultaneously reflects the stylized 
facts of the business cycle and the financial markets.  This mechanism also leads to an economy 
with a variable economy-wide CRRA, although their pricing kernel is also stationary.  As in the 
model presented here, the favorable financial properties they report are almost entirely 
attributable to the variation in risk sharing alone.  The one drawback to their model is the 
excessive dividend volatility required to match the data well, a feature unnecessary in the 
formulation considered here. 
  Although they analyze a much more complex multiagent model in continuous time, the 
construct of Kraus and Sagi (2000) shares many of the features of this model as well as many of 
its principal conclusions.  As in this model, they incorporate randomly changing risk aversion.  
They also incorporate elements of market incompleteness, however, a feature absent here.  
Similar to the principal conclusion of this paper, these authors also find that the equity premium 
“depends not so much on the level of relative risk aversion as on the volatility of the relative risk 
aversion.”  Our much simpler model argues that their incorporation of incompleteness may be an 
unnecessary complication.  
  Lastly we mention Melino and Yang (2001) who undertake a similar exercise using 
Epstein-Zinn/Weil preferences where the CRRA and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 
(EIS) can be specified independently.  With state dependence in both the CRRA and EIS, they 
are able to match perfectly the first two moments of equity and risk free returns.  This result 
follows from two features of their model: (1) the certainty equivalent is linear homogenous  
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which eliminates the level effect, while (2) the variation in two parameters provides additional 
“degrees of freedom.” In effect, the underlying mechanism is thus not the same as the one 
considered here. 
  All of these papers have one thing in common, and it is this:  for replicating financial data 
what is critical is the preference characteristics of the representative agents.  The characteristics 
of the dividend process are only marginally relevant. 
5.  Concluding Comments 
  State dependent preferences are increasingly popular. In finance the accent is applied to 
the plausible hypothesis that risk aversion is not constant. In this paper we have shown that the 
most natural representation of this hypothesis has profound implications for asset pricing. It 
implies in particular that the IMRS is level dependent and that this dependence introduces 
another source of volatility potentially more powerful than the volatility of the fundamentals 
being priced. This in turn leads to a reversal of the paradoxes first identified in the seminal work 
of Mehra and Prescott (1985).  Asymptotically, the risk free rate is too low, the equity premium 
too high, and the standard deviations of all security returns are much too high.  The Hansen-
Jagannathan bounds are easily satisfied.  
Is the model reasonable?  The non-stationarity of the resulting economy is disturbing 
although it can be argued that it would possibly not be detectable with usual tests and available 
data sets. At a minimum our exploration should serve as a warning, for those researchers 
naturally inclined to postulate state dependent preferences, of the powerful mechanism and the 
unintended non stationarity this hypothesis may thus generate for their model environment.   
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Appendix 1 
A.  Constructive Existence of Equilibrium for the Economy of Section 2 
  We construct the equilibrium price function for probability structure (2.9).  Without loss 
of generality, let us assume  1 y0 = ,  { } 2 1 i 0 x , x x x ˛ = , and that  i i a ) a(x = .  By recursive 





p(y,x)=p(1,x)=ßpx+ßpx+ßpp(xx) ￿  
      21 1-a1-a 23
ikk2k2ikk1k1
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ßpp(xx)ßppp(xxx) ++ ￿￿￿ lll
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ikk2k2
k
ßppp(xxx) ++ ￿￿ lll
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K, 
where we have done nothing more that segregate the terms in the sum according to whether the 
state in each future time period is x1 or x2.  We note that the exponent in each term depends only 
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    i1i2 ˆˆ p(x,x)p(x,x) ”+ 
These semi-prices  ij ˆ p(x,x) can, in turn, be computed as the solution to a system of linear 
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ijji111ji222j ˆˆ xxp(x,x)  xp(x,x)
a aa ØøØø =bp+bp+bp ºßºß  
We observe that (A.2.3) constitutes a system of four linear equations in the four unknowns 
ij ˆ p(x,x),  {1,2} j {1,2}, i ˛ ˛ .  They constitute the basic valuation factors for equity securities in 
this economy in a manner that will now be made apparent. 
Our objective is to obtain a recursive style representation for the equity security when the 
current output level is y and the current growth state is  ) (a x i i . 





















































i1i2 ˆˆ yp(x,x)  yp(x,x)
a+aa+a =+. 
  Given a sequence of growth rates {xt} generated to respect the chosen transition matrix 
(2.9) and the resulting output sequence as per (2.1), the corresponding equilibrium price 
sequence  t p  can thus be generated as per 
(A.2.5)  
1t2t 1-1-
ttttt1tt2 ˆˆ pp(y,x)  yp(x,x)yp(x,x)
a+aa+a ==+   
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with the associated equity return sequence is given by  










=-    
  Expression (A.2.5) makes sense if the semi prices  ij ˆ p(x,x) are well defined.  A strong 




-a b< ,   i{1,2},j{1,2}. ˛˛  
  This development leads to the following theorem: 
Theorem A.1.1:  Suppose u(  ) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously 
differentiable on (o, 8), and that condition (A.2.6) is satisfied.  Then an equilibrium price 
function exists for the economy of Section 2. 
Proof:  Equation (2.11) represents the representative agents necessary and sufficient first order 
condition on which the market clearing conditions have been imposed.  By construction a price 
function satisfying (A.2.5) will satisfy (2.11).  By (A.2.6) such a price function exists and is well 
defined.  
 
B.  Constructing Sequences of Equilibrium Risk Free Security Prices and Rates of Return 
As noted in the text (equation (2.12)), the risk free security is priced according to: 












= ￿ . 
  Once again,  ti q(y,x)is level dependent so that equation (A.2.7) also represents a 
countably infinite system necessitating numerical solution methods.  
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  The procedure  is much simpler than in the case of the equity security, however.  For the 
same {xt} and associated {yt} constructed above, the corresponding sequence of risk free asset 
prices was constructed according to (A.2.6) with the risk free rate series defined according to 








  For all cases reported in this paper the lengths of the constructed time series of returns 
were no less than 10,000.  All financial statistics represent averages of those obtained for 10,000 
independently constructed time series.  As a final check on our procedures we precisely 
replicated the results in Mehra and Prescott (1985) for the cases of their parameterization.  These 
remarks bring with them the appreciation not only of the elegance and simplicity of the Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) formulation but also of its highly specialized nature. 
 
C:  Pure Monte-Carlo Simulation of Equation (2.11) 
  Here we provide an alternative to the procedure of sections A and B and one that was 
used as a verification for computational accuracy. 
Our alternative statistical summaries of equity and risk free return distributions are based 
on return sequences of length 10,000.  To generate these latter sequences we began by first 
generating a time series of random output growth rates { } t x of 10,001 unit length, which 
respected (2.9).  The corresponding output sequence  { }
000 , 10 t
0 t t y
=
=  then satisfied. 
(A.2.8)     y0  ”  1, 
yt   =   xt yt-1, t = 1, …, 10,000. 
At each time period, the corresponding equity price  tt p(y, x)was estimated as follows: 
suppose for some time period  ˆˆ tt t,(y,x) %  = ( i y,x % ).  Starting from xi, we next generated 1000  
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independent growth rate sequences { } , 1000 ..., , 2 , 1 k , x
k
s =  each of length 1,000 (s = 1, …, 1000) 
(for every sequence k,  { }
k
1 x  ” xi), all of which respected (2.9). 
To each of these sequences { }
k
s x , there corresponds an associated output sequence 
generated as per 
   
k
0 yys0 == %  






s = = - . 
Using these sequences the price of the security, 
e
i P(y,x) % was then estimated as 















  In a similar fashion, the corresponding price of the risk free security,  i q(y,x) %  is directly 
computed via (2.12).  The choice of k = 1000 and s = 1000 is somewhat arbitrary.  It is justified 
by the fact that if  , ) x ( a ” a  and the model is otherwise parameterized as in Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) (same  ), , , , , , , 22 21 12 11 p p p p d m b then the Monte-Carlo solution methodology replicates 
the price and return results those authors obtain to three decimal places when  10 £ a .  This latter 
upper bound vastly exceeds any values of  ) x ( i a needed for our principal results. 
  Both methods gave identical results to two decimal places. 
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